Anthropogenic climate change has been presented as the archetypal global problem, identified by the slow work of assembling a global knowledge infrastructure, and demanding a concertedly global political response. But this 'global' knowledge has distinctive geographies, shaped by histories of exploration and colonialism, by diverse epistemic and material cultures of knowledge-making, and by the often messy processes of linking scientific knowledge to decision-making within different polities. We suggest that understanding of the knowledge politics of climate change may benefit from engagement with literature on the geographies of science. We review work from across the social sciences which resonates with geographers' interests in the spatialities of scientific knowledge, to build a picture of what we call the epistemic geographies of climate change. Moving from the field site and the computer model to the conference room and international political negotiations, we examine the spatialities of the interactional co-production of knowledge and social order. In so doing, we aim to proffer a new approach to the intersections of space, knowledge and power which can enrich geography's engagements with the politics of a changing climate.
on the role of climate models at the intersections of science and politics, we explore how particular spatial constructions have emerged which reflect, but also serve to challenge, existing forms of scientific and political order.
II Geographies of science
Space, place and locality are now canonical concepts across science studies (e.g. Barry 1993; Shapin 1998; Secord 2004; Henke & Gieryn 2008) . This 'embracing of the spatial' (Turnbull 2002, 273) builds upon constructivist epistemologies which regard scientific knowledge 'primarily as a human product, made with locally situated cultural and material resources, rather than as simply the revelation of a pre-given order of nature' (Golinski 2005, xvii ; see also Demeritt 2001; . STS scholars have posed a number of answers to Simon Schaffer's (1991, 190) question of how to address the distinction 'between the processes of 'localization', through which local techniques get to work at sites like labs via the concentration of widely distributed resources', and 'spatialization', through which 'techniques which are efficacious within the lab. manage to travel beyond it ' (quoted in Powell 2007a, 313) .
As Powell shows in a wide-ranging review (2007a), answers to these questions have drawn on varied conceptions of spatiality. A 'socio-spatial' school of historical sociologists, inspired by the Strong Programme and focused in the main on what Finnegan (2008, 374) calls 'science in situ', has revealed how solutions to epistemological problems of warrant, credibility and attribution are to be found in local socio-spatial arrangements, through practices of social exclusion and inclusion of the 'geographically privileged' (Shapin 1988, 375) , which in turn reflect broader forms of social hierarchy and order (Shapin & Schaffer 1985; Shapin 1984; . Relatedly, students of the architectures of science have developed the argument that 'spatial arrangements determine the degrees of visibility and social interaction within architectural structures' (Powell 2007a, 315) , thus connecting concerns with the rhetorical boundaries of science (Gieryn 1983) with an interest in the architectural materialisation of science's socio-cultural boundaries (Galison & Thompson 1991; Gieryn 2000; . Ethnographic studies of laboratory spaces have provided insights into distinctive 'epistemic cultures' constituted by different social, symbolic and technical machineries of knowledge production (KnorrCetina 1999; see also Traweek 1988; Collins 1992; Pickering 1995; Mol 2002) . They have also informed influential posthumanist theories of scientific practice and constitutive co-production such as actor-network theory (ANT), which extend Bloor's (1976) symmetry principle to the analytical distribution of agency across human and nonhuman actors (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 1987; Law & Mol 2001) .
This focus on the constitutive spaces of scientific practice has been complemented by work concerned with what Naylor (2005) terms the spatial contexts of science, which stresses how scientific endeavours have been shaped by particular urban (Inkster & Morrell 1983; Elliott 2000; Withers et al. 2008) , regional (Livingstone 2003; Lorimer 2003; Naylor 2010) or national cultures (Nye 1993; Withers 2007; Golinski 2010; Walker 2012), or by processes of imperialism and globalisation (MacLeod 2000; Bennett & Hodge 2011; Jasanoff 2006 ).
Geographers of science, so far, have taken much of their inspiration from the socio-spatial school of thought (Finnegan 2008) , seeking to develop 'social geographies of both warranted assertibility in general, and of science in particular, in ways sensitive to the context-dependent nature of meaning and to the negotiated transfer and movement of ideas between sites' (Withers & Livingstone 1999, 16, emphasis in original) . As well as the social and material spaces of knowledge-making and the 'performance spaces of science' then (Livingstone 2005a, 97; Wainwright & Williams 2008) , historical geographers have analysed the range of social, literary and communicative technologies which must be mobilised to enable scientific knowledge to travel (e.g. Naylor 2006; Keighren 2010; Ogborn & Withers 2010; Withers & Keighren 2011) . Questions of knowledge 'reception' have also risen to prominence with David Livingstone, for example, producing a number of influential arguments about the regional, national and transnational geographies of textual interpretation and 'hermeneutic encounters', which see ideas and knowledge interpreted in different ways in different places according to a contingent range of cultural, political and historical conditions (Livingstone 2005b; also Rupke 1999; Secord 2000; Daston 2004; Keighren 2010) .
ANT has likewise been an influential approach to understanding 'science in motion' (Finnegan 2008, 378) , addressing Schaffer's (1991) spatialization question by theorising the expansion of material-semiotic networks of heterogeneous actors and associations, through which scientific products can travel as 'immutable mobiles' (Callon 1986; Law 1986; Latour 1987) . But understanding science in motion is often less about standardisation and the secure transfer of ideas and artefacts, as about understanding more unstable geographies of encounter and hybridisation between different forms of knowledge and practice (Finnegan 2008) . More recent moves to enhance ANT's ability to deal with questions of power and difference inside and outside of networks Here, 'the replacement of the dominant conception of universal rationality with notions of the local geographies of knowledge' (Powell 2007a, 319-20) has played out in studies of how 'indigenous' forms of knowledge are written-out both of postcolonial development programmes and of conventional historiographies of 'western' science (Chambers & Gillespie 2000; Raj 2007) . Important accounts of hybrid encounters between culturally different modes of knowledge-making have not only enhanced our understandings of colonial and postcolonial history, but have spawned new modes of critique of scientific, economic and cultural globalisation (Miller 2004a; Jasanoff 2006) . Livingstone (2002) and Wainwright (2012) , following Gregory (1995) and Crang (1998) , have urged geographers to put these conceptual tools to work on contemporary cultures of physical-geographical knowledge production, and recent debates about a 'critical physical geography' point towards innovative cross-disciplinary conversations about the nature of geographical knowledge (Lave et al. 2013; also Tadaki et al. 2012; Head & Gibson 2012) . Others have argued for the tools of geography of science to be turned towards wider cultures of scientific knowledge making, including the epistemic communities shaping public discourses on climate change (Hulme 2008 ) and the Anthropocene (Castree 2015) i . The rest of this paper responds to this challenge, seeking to illustrate what a geographical focus on the knowledge politics of climate can tell us about the wider cultural politics of environmental change. In the next section we begin our consideration of the epistemic geographies of climate change by exploring canonical and emerging work in STS, focusing on particular spaces of knowledge production and circulation -namely the field, the knowledge assessment and the international conference. In the subsequent section we turn to the climate model as perhaps the most powerful site of climatic knowledge production, but a site which helps us to advance an argument about the geographies of interactional co-production.
III Constitutive spaces of climate knowledge-making

Field
Geographers of science have taken a particular interest in the constitution and nature of 'the field' as a particular kind of scientific space (e. g Crang 1998; Naylor 2002; Powell 2002 Powell , 2007b Powell , 2008 Lorimer & Spedding 2005; Matless & Cameron 2006; Richards 2011; Forsyth 2013) . The field, as Kohler (2002) argues, occupies a curious position between laboratory and landscape (e.g. Melillo et al. 2011) . It is in some senses a controlled space -selected perhaps for its representativeness or its boundedness, or its amenity for total surveillance.
But it also evades control. It is inherently a part of much wider human or nonhuman systems, and thus resists attempts at segregation and insulation (Finnegan 2008, 380) . The field can, however, be a marker of authority -of empirical authenticity against the fabrications and abstractions of the laboratory (Forsyth 2013; Latour & Woolgar 1979) , and as a source of entwined sensory, experiential and technical knowledge (Powell 2007b; O'Reilly 2016) . In climate science, the field often disappears from view as the global climate system dominates scientific and political discourses (see section IV). Yet despite the successful construction of a global atmosphere -through satellite imagery (Benson 2012 ) and computer models (Edwards 2010 ) -the field has offered resources for an empiricist streak in climate science, which sometimes conflicts with the hegemony of global, computerised simulation.
That the field is a contested source of epistemic authority is well illustrated by Sverker Sörlin's work on mid-20 th century glaciology, meteorology and climate change discourse. For a figure like Swedish glaciologist Hans Ahlmann, the glacier, as an object and site of field science, was the key to authoritative empirical knowledge of potential swings in climate, whether natural or anthropogenic (Carey 2007; Carey et al. 2016) . Ahlmann extended both the laboratory and the human body into the field, enacting a distinctly 'Nordicist' culture of field glaciology which integrated concerns for authoritative field observations with a form of scientific internationalism and a tentative receptiveness towards 'local' knowledges in Greenland and Iceland (Sörlin 2011) . In anxiously seeking to establish the glacier as a truth-spot (Gieryn 2006) , perhaps recognising that his knowledge 'could not escape its embeddedness in the field site', Ahlmann sought to transcend heroism and self-sacrifice in field expeditions (Hevly 1996; Carey et al. 2016 ) in favour of a 'long durée of observation' built upon heterogeneous assemblages of instrumental installations, bodily work, 'local' knowledge and laboratorylike practices of precision (Sörlin 2011, 84 (Yusoff 2005; Turchetti et al. 2008; Howkins 2011; O'Reilly 2016) . Emerging work is examining the material constitution and practices of field sites in sub-disciplines such as dendroclimatology, from where tree samples are transported along an extended chain of reference (Latour 1999, 70) within itself the very sense of a global ecumene to which its scientific work ultimately is addressed' (Skrydstrup 2016, 14) . The project of producing scalar correspondence between the field and the global is not just epistemological, but cosmo-political.
The broader production of scalar correspondence has proceeded through uneven economies of recognition.
Anthropologist Ben Orlove and colleagues argue that biophysical 'regions' like the Arctic and small oceanic islands have become particularly prominent parts of the geographical imagination of climatic change, as opposed to arguably equally vulnerable mountain or desert environments. The 'distribution of concern about climate change impacts is historically situated and constructed rather than solely a reflection of environmental dynamics', Orlove et al. (2014, 249) Geographers have developed perspectives on 'adaptation' as a travelling idea. These have used concepts from STS and critical policy studies to examine the translation (or spatialization) of a certain ontology of adaptation and its enrolment into local political projects (Yamane 2009; , such as reforestation projects and the forced resettlement of farmers in Rwanda (Gebauer & Doevenspeck 2015; see also Bhatasara 2015) and 'best practice' adaptation to climate change in Pacific islands (Webber 2015) .
'Adaptation science' (Moss et al. 2013 ) can be considered an epistemic 'trading zone' (Galison 1997) , where global climate simulation intersects with field-based research on socio-ecological systems and human vulnerabilities. As Castree (2015, 306) notes, this 'grounded socio-environmental research' is married with a desire 'to transfer lessons about inquiry and intervention internationally'. It is a powerful site of co-production, where new knowledges are emerging and traveling alongside new political subjectivities and modes of governmental intervention (Eriksen et al. 2015) . We might also consider adaptation science a 'translation zone'
in Andrew Barry's (2013b) Further work which conjoins this concern for the discursive and cognitive aspects of adaptation science (Preston et al. 2015) with a critical engagement with the 'field sites' of adaptation research and practice (e.g.
Popke 2016) would add necessary empirical detail to Orlove et al.'s (2014) broad-brush observations of the uneven spatialities of climate change knowledges. Emerging work on the intersection of climate change narratives with the cultural geographies of landscape offers a promising entry point into thinking about climate change in its guises as intellectual artefact, material phenomenon, and 'embodied and experiential process' (Brace & Geoghegan 2010, 296 ; also Leyshon & Geoghegan 2012; Matless 2014; Rice et al. 2015) .
Assessment
Much scholarly attention to the politics of climate change knowledges has concerned practices of scientific possible to study such an organisation using the terms, for example, of the 'socio-spatial' of historians and geographers whose concern is the mutual constitution of the physical and social boundaries of scientific sites (Powell 2007a, 313) ?
We can at least begin by re-visiting the more geographically-sensitive work by students of the IPCC. (Ford et al. 2011) , to a lack of governmental interest in the process in certain cases (Biermann 2001) , and to occasions of distrust on the part of certain scientific and political communities in the global South with regard to problem framings and arguments which do not sit comfortably with alternative epistemic and normative commitments (Lahsen 2004; Fogel 2004; Mahony 2014 ). The new knowledge claims and framings (Miller 2000) produced by IPCC assessment processes can be seen as products of particular, situated commitments to forms of epistemic and social order. Russill (2016) has recently argued that the dominance of geophysical modelling and 'trend detection' practices, as opposed to more ecological approaches to climate-society relations, can be traced to 1980s US energy politics (also Howe 2014). The dominance of 'top-down', global modelling strategies (Beck 2011a; Hulme 2011; Nielsen & Sejersen 2012 ) and of particular economic rationalities (Randalls 2011a ) subsequently coloured the way issues like carbon sequestration have been presented in IPCC documents. As Fogel (2004; and Blok (2010) argue, areas of the global South have been presented as 'blank' spaces to be fed into the calculative regimes which underpin efforts to offset Northern emissions through mitigation projects in the South (see Bumpus & Liverman 2008; Lovell & Liverman 2010) . New practices of carbon accounting are co-produced with reterritorialisations of the carbon cycle, creating 'a peculiar situation whereby a territorial substance...which contributes to a change in the operation of natural systems at a post-territoriality scale, is conceived, of, classified, and managed through its association with the persistent territorialities of nation-states' (Whitehead et al. 2007, 205; Lövbrand & Stripple 2006; Twyman et al. 2015) These powerful co-productions of the epistemic and normative content of climate knowledges have offered foci of contestation 'among competing models of knowledge-making and governance' (Jasanoff 2010, 240 Jasanoff (2011) argues that the uneven response to the controversy in different countries tells us something about how IPCC knowledge travels. While the IPCC and its scientist-authors came in for heavy criticism in the UK and the US, the episode received scant attention in German media (Beck 2012 ).
Seeking to go beyond explanations of this which would appeal simply to particular mass media cultures and conservative lobbying activities, Jasanoff (2011) argues that distinct 'civic epistemologies' were at play.
The notion of civic epistemology emerged from studies of regulatory science in the interactional tradition of co-productionist inquiry, and builds on the observation that 'modern technoscientific cultures have developed tacit knowledge-ways through which they assess the rationality and robustness of claims that seek to order their lives; demonstrations or arguments that fail to meet these tests may be dismissed as illegitimate or irrational' (Jasanoff 2005, 255 ; see also Wynne 2003; Miller 2004b) . These distinctive 'knowledge-ways' are embedded in apparently national cultures of public knowledge-making which are historically textured yet seemingly stable over time. An American tradition of pluralistic knowledge-making and ad-hoc decisionmaking in adversarial national institutions can be contrasted with more depoliticized regulatory practices in continental Western Europe. Jasanoff (2011) sees in German civic epistemology a form of risk aversion which disavows the kind of scepticism expressed, especially in UK and US contexts, towards predictions of catastrophic climate change. In these two Anglophone cultures such predictions rub up against respective commitments to 'common sense empiricism' and to a form of quantitative objectivity which historically came to prominence amid political efforts to unite a sceptical and divided polity (Porter 1995; see also Beck 2012 ).
Although we should be wary of essentialising 'national cultures', the concept of civic epistemology offers a means of adding geographical texture to understandings of how and why the boundaries between science and non-science, objectivity and subjectivity, are drawn where they are.
Institutions like the IPCC nonetheless pose challenges to the concept. They are transnational, and involve the participation of government representatives who may bear with them distinctive political or civicepistemological commitments (Mahony 2015) . It is therefore important to attend to the agonistic processes by which knowledge framings are constructed within such institutional spaces. Peter Haas's 'epistemic communities' model of how shared scientific knowledge is transmitted to policy-makers (Haas 1992; arguably pays insufficient attention to the material and social processes by which 'shared' knowledge 'comes to be shared in the first place' (Miller 2001, 248) . The IPCC provides an ideal setting to study the practices and (Mahony 2015) , has proven a useful methodological opening. However, ethnographic work within organisations like the IPCC is challenging, due both to questions of access and to the dispersed, largely virtual nature of the organisation.
Few have been welcomed into relationships of 'ethnographic complicity' (Marcus 1998 , 105) -O'Reilly (2015 in collaborative relationships with IPCC authors, Petersen (2006) attached to a government delegation are two exceptions. Significantly however, the IPCC has recently adopted a formal process for granting ethnographic access to social researchers (IPCC 2015) . Important opportunities are therefore arising for social scientists to study the epistemic and political complexities of climate knowledge-making inside the IPCC through close, multi-sited ethnographic engagement (Marcus 1995; Krauss 2009; Braun 2006) .
Conference
A wide range of literature on the production and circulation of climate science on public stages has been emerging (Yusoff & Gabrys 2011) , examining for example the place of film (Svoboda 2016 
IV Co-production in the model spaces of climate
Geographers of science have emphasised, with varying explicitness, that the task of understanding the geographies of scientific practice and culture is inseparable from the task of understanding the wider geographical agency of science itself (Naylor 2005; Finnegan 2008; Livingstone 2010) . This agency may manifest in new imaginations of spatial order, material relationships or spatial rationalities. Turnbull (2000) uses the notion of 'knowledge space' to describe the dialectical co-production of knowledge and social space through the assemblage of heterogeneous components both within the laboratory, and in the wider spatialization of laboratory artefacts and practices (cf. Powell & Vasudevan 2007) . In critical geography, such considerations have been most immediately apparent in the history of cartography where the political effects of particular spatial representations have been at the forefront of critical inquiry (Crampton 2001; Harley 2002; Pickles 2004; Cosgrove 2008 ; see also Donovan et al. 2012 ). However, we would suggest that geographers can do more to consider the links between the constitutive spaces of science and the spaces which science constructs as epistemic categories. STS scholars have made important contributions to our understanding of how space as an epistemic construct is co-produced with new configurations of political order and rationality.
The territorialisation of the carbon cycle, for example, through new calculative means is one process which has caught the attention of critical social scientists and geographers (Whitehead et al. 2007; Lövbrand et al. 2009; Doyle & Chaturvedi 2010; Blok 2010; Lövbrand & Stripple 2011; Randalls 2011b) . We seek to bring these overlapping modes of thought into closer conversation, firstly by focusing on one particular site, tool, and object of climate change knowledges, the general circulation model (GCM). (Gramelsberger 2006, 78) Complex scientific models of the climate system have long occupied a prominent place in the cultural politics of climate change. Models have offered numbers and visions of putative futures, which have been woven into narratives oscillating between the certainty of impending crisis and the hazy, disarming uncertainty of innumerable possible outcomes of social and environmental change (Yusoff 2009 ). Epistemologically, climate models challenge the presumed independence of theory, observation and experiment (Helmreich 1998; Dowling 1999; Morrison 1999; Sismondo 2008; Guillemot 2010) . Culturally, they unsettle conventional boundaries between fact and value, or logic and rhetoric (Shackley & Wynne 1996; Jasanoff & Wynne 1998; Ravetz 2003; Hulme 2011) . And politically, models depict environmental change as a set of interlinked problems which can only be properly addressed at global scales (Ashley 1983; Demeritt 2001; Miller 2004c; Oels 2005; Dahan 2010; Hulme 2010b) . Model representations of the 'earth system', with their fecundity of interrelated, human-nonhuman sub-systems, appear to offer societies a demanding totality which must be prudently managed within prescribed boundaries and limits (Knox 2014).
General circulation models of the atmosphere, ocean and other 'Earth system components' have become the dominant, perhaps hegemonic, way in which knowledge of future climates is constructed (Heymann et al, forthcoming) . As Gramelsberger (2006) argues, climate models not only describe the world in a theoretical language of dynamical equations rendered in computer code, but also enact the world as an object of experimental research. As if in a Latourian laboratory, an abstract, purified climate system is coaxed into existence from a rarefied computer language and subjected to experimental manipulation, before difficult questions of evaluation, validation and credibility are explored in oftentimes very public 'trials of strength' (Latour 1987) .
Scholars of interactional co-production have argued that global climate models have reinforced, and been reinforced by, increasingly globalist forms of politics and spatial imagination (Shackley et al. 1998; Demeritt 2001; Miller 2004a; Hulme 2010b; Gurevitch 2014) . Global mean temperature (GMT) has been the key index of observed and simulated anthropogenic climate change, as opposed to alternatives like radiative forcing or ocean heat content. While estimates of the equilibrium response of the climate system to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide have remained remarkably stable (and equally uncertain) over time (Van Der Sluijs et al. 1998; IPCC 2014) , so too has GMT endured as the organising metric of international climate politics: the 'story of global climate has in many senses become the story of global temperature' (Hulme 2010b, 560) . GMT has furnished an indexed storyline of change, become a focus of sceptical challenges, and become the locus of normative policy targets, such as the goal of limiting warming to 2°C (or 1.5°C) above pre-industrial temperatures (Randalls 2010a; Morseletto et al. 2016) . The 2°C target has nonetheless faced challenges as both a feasible target (Geden 2015; Anderson 2015) , and as an accurate, just representation of the threshold of 'dangerous' climate change (Shaw 2016 ) -challenges which were forcefully aired at the 2015 climate negotiations in Paris and related debates about whether integrated assessment models were smuggling-in impossible assumptions about carbon sequestration in order to retain the virtual feasibility and political authority of temperature targets (Geden 2015; Anderson & Peters 2016) .
GMT is the product of the 'panoptic gaze' of global data and models (Barnett et al. 2009 ), the power of which lies in its making-visible of new, governable objects (Scott 1998; Oels 2005) . It is a gaze which isolates and divides, separating global process from local experience ( The fact that climate models can fit into a philosopher's pocket (Gramelsberger 2006) In contrast, Howe (2014) recounts efforts at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder,
Colorado to inculcate a particularly collaborative, experimental research culture through architecture, with a building designed, like the NEEM station, to ease interpersonal interactions (Skrydstrup 2016 ). NCAR's veritable revolving door of visiting scientists can be read as a response to an environment wherein atmospheric scientists were wary of co-optation into Cold War research structures, the institution's relative autonomy and lively circulation of scientists a form of resistance to the increasingly centralizing tendencies of US science policy (see also Bassi 2015) . Such institutional cultures are formed through the intersection of various geographies: national, perhaps in the form of distinct civic epistemologies (Mahony & Hulme 2016);  regional, in the broader patterns of scientific exchange which constitute trans-local cultures of scientific practice (Livingstone 2003; Finnegan 2008; Naylor 2010; cf. Beck et al. 2013; ; and global, in the shape of infrastructural globalisms (Edwards 2006) and attendant moves towards new forms of global, universalizing scientific practice (Miller 2015) .
Assembling the region
Questions remain on how to make sense of the links between such institutional geographies and the geographies which are the objects of institutional knowledge-making. Laborde (2015) uses Foucault's notion of heterotopia (Foucault 1986 ) for this purpose (Ophir & Shapin 1991; Smith & Agar 1998) Practices of anticipation act through, and upon, present geographies (Anderson 2010) . The circulation of regional models, for example, has brought new geographies of cross-national scientific cooperation into being, with organisations like the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre in Belize acting as regional hubs for predictive information and policy advice (see also the geography outlined in Giorgi et al. 2006) . As Barnes (2015) has suggested, the act of defining the 'region' to be modelled can be deeply political; something recognised by IPCC authors in guidelines for regional modelling: 'An important geo-political issue may be the importance of national representation in climate models in the context of international negotiations (i.e., it may matter if a country is or is not on the map)' (Mearns et al. 2003, 21) . Existing studies of the role of models in politics have focused on how information and assumptions flow across social boundaries, or more simply on what kinds of information different decision-makers feel that they need.
What is needed now, however, is further work on the actual political effects of new modes of simulation. By this we mean we mean two things: the processes of constitutive and interactional co-production by which different spaces and scales (e.g. the nation, the region, the 'local') are jointly constituted as epistemic and political objects (Whitehead et al. 2007; Moore 2008; Rangan & Kull 2009) ; and the effects of this coproduction on shifting societal engagements with climate change (Jónsdóttir 2013; also Ahlborg & Nightingale 2012; Beck et al. 2014) . One debate to which geographers can contribute is about the role of simulation models in the ontological work of defining certain local weather events as anthropogenic or 'natural', and the implications of such distinctions for the social distribution of risk and responsibility (Hulme et al. 2011) .
Geographers can reflect on the extent to which simulation is a distinct practice of representation and of worldmaking, and how simulation becomes a site of heterogeneous engineering (Law 1987) of equivalences and differences between objects, artefacts, practices and places in the production of new climatic knowledge spaces (Turnbull 2000) .
V Conclusion
We have offered an approach to making sense of climate politics which emphasises the diverse and contested spatialities of climate change knowledges. The notion of epistemic geographies emphasises the world-making powers of accredited scientific knowledges, but it also brings attention to the local and trans-local attainment of scientific authority, and to the indeterminate boundaries between science and its others. Investigating the geographies of science 'implies more than an acknowledgement of the locational context of science ' (Driver 1994, 338) . It is rather a conceptually heterodox attempt to answer the question of how space matters in the production and circulation of authoritative scientific knowledges. In section II we introduced a number of approaches to this question, which can be broadly bracketed as constitutive and interactional understandings of the co-production of knowledge, space and power. We then reviewed existing empirical engagements with the epistemic geographies of climate change, relying, to a large extent, on work from outside geography,
which nonetheless exhibits resonances with extant work on historical and contemporary geographies of science.
There is scope and need for greater theoretical reflection on the spatialities of scientific knowledge and on science's role in the ongoing (re)making of common cultural, political and material worlds (e.g. Carey et al. 2016) . We have suggested the STS notion of co-production as one fruitful mode of thought which is largely absent from geographical work on climate change thus far. Co-production encourages analytical symmetry in its treatment of science and politics, knowledge and power, and is therefore an appropriate lens through which to view the complex cultural politics of climate change. For the epistemic geographies of climate change, co-production draws attention to how certain '[r]epresentations of the natural world attain stability and persuasive power' (Jasanoff 2010, 236) . But this is achieved 'not through forcible detachment from context' as ANT modes of thought tend to suggest, 'but through constant, mutually sustaining interactions between our senses of the is and the ought: of how things are and how they should be' (ibid, 236).
Such a perspective has significant practical implications for how public policy and practice in response to climate change is shaped. Knowledge, of whatever sort, can never arise independently of culture, from human ways of doing things. And so knowledge of climate always carries with it beliefs and values about the world it is seeking to describe. The objective of the IPCC to make knowledge which is 'policy relevant, but policy neutral' is therefore a chimera and needs calling out. The ambition of Future Earth to 'co-produce knowledge'
for transformation of society is more promising, but urgently needs the awareness of the knowledge politics of climate change which the geographical scholarship reviewed here can offer (see Castree et al. 2014) . Acting in the world may be a corollary of knowing the world, but how one acts is already bound up with how one knows.
Different knowledges lead to different actions.
An expanded notion of the epistemic geographies of climate change departs from an interest in geographies of circulating knowledges to examine the geographies of diverse ways of knowing; the spatialities of the sites, practices, discourses and imaginations through which climate is made known, whether these spatialities are dominant or marginal, authoritative or contested. As such it is an approach which articulates new questions about the nature of knowledge and possibilities for acting in the world (Arendt 2013) . We have identified promising new areas of research, including the cultural geographies of the field and of adaptation science, the epistemic cultures of scientific assessment, public spaces of scientific performance, and the performativity of simulation at multiple scales. To this list we may add the public and private organisational spaces of climate work including emissions accounting (Asdal 2008 (Asdal , 2011 Lovell & Mackenzie 2011) and carbon trading (Callon 2009; Lovell & Ghaleigh 2013) , the 'intermediary' networks of consultants, communicators and activists who 'play explicit roles in producing and circulating' climate knowledges (Larner 2011, 330) , and the (largely virtual) spaces where the claims of mainstream climate science are being publicly contested (Sharman 2014; Pearce et al. 2014; Sharman & Howarth 2016) . Such work would allow deeper exploration of the co-production of diverse, even dissident knowledges, practices and political imaginations (Demeritt 2006) . The cultural geographies of all of these spaces may shed further light on how, in the case of climate change, 'science does not transcend our particularities; it discloses them' (Livingstone 2002, 10) .
